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Non-Technical Summary
The paper deals with the effects of publicly funded research at universities, poly-
technics and federal and state financed research labs on industrial innovations in Ger-
many. In order to understand the current state of public research institutions in Ger-
many, chapter two shortly describes its historical context, characterized by the tradi-
tional Central European view of natural science as a value in itself, the inertia of public
institutions and tensions between federal and state responsibility for science policy.
In the third chapter we will deal with the following question: Are innovating compa-
nies able to identify the contribution of  public research to industrial innovations and
trace the source of these innovations? In a postal questionnaire, 2,300 companies were
asked whether they had introduced innovations between 1993 and 1995 that would not
have been developed without public research. Less than one tenth of product or proc-
ess innovating firms said that they had introduced public-research-based innovations.
The public-research-based products account for approximately 5% of all sales with
new products. Even more important are the differences in the effectiveness of technol-
ogy transfer between different types of public research institutions. Universities are
cited by firms with publicly supported innovations as the most important source, al-
though publicly financed labs get almost as much citations. When firms were asked to
name the most important public institutes, they most frequently cited the institutes of
the Fraunhofer-Society. It seems obvious that their technology transfer is spurred by
the higher share of research funds from industry. Big science labs are almost invisible,
suggesting that their technology transfer to industrial firms still lacks effectiveness.
One of the basic findings is that a considerable share of companies can indeed identify
product and process innovations which they would not have developed in the absence
of recent research of public institutions. The results are similar to the findings of
Mansfield (1991) for the U.S. On the side of the firms, we find that German firms with
R&D activities are more likely to profit from public research. Private and public re-
search thus complement each other. Proximity may not have the same importance in
Germany than in other countries, especially the U.S. The thesis that proximity is im-
portant especially for high-tech or R&D-intensive industries is clearly rejected in the
case of Germany. Although firms tend to cite research institutions that are located in
their local area, firms which are closer to the public research have no higher propensity
to receive public research spillover. Contrary to the widely held opinion that proximity
to public research institution does promote collaboration between firms and public re-
search institutions and increases the amount of received knowledge spillovers. Firms
with a high R&D intensity cite remote public research institutes more frequently than
less R&D intensive firms, suggesting that in Germany high-tech does not depend on
co-location of public and private research. Yet, polytechnics tend to support small
companies within their region, while universities and other research labs transfer
knowledge more effectively to larger companies with no regional priority. Still, the
most critical success factor for technology transfer is a firm´s own R&D activity.
Zusammenfassung
Wie viele industrielle Innovationen bringt die öffentliche Forschung hervor? Die vor-
liegende Untersuchung versucht, diese Frage zu beantworten und damit die wirtschaft-
liche Rechtfertigung für Finanzierung und Durchführung von natur- und ingenieurwis-
senschaftlicher Forschung in öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen empirisch zu über-
prüfen. Hierfür wurden rund 2.300 Unternehmen in der vierten Innovationserhebung
von ZEW und infas im Jahr 1996 gefragt, ob sich unter ihren zwischen 1993 und 1995
eingeführten Innovationen neue Produkte und Prozesse befanden, die ohne die neueren
Forschungsergebnisse von Hochschulen und anderen öffentlichen finanzierten For-
schungseinrichtungen nicht oder nur mit zeitlicher Verzögerung von mehr als einem
Jahr aufgenommen worden wären. Knapp 9 % der Unternehmen mit Innovationen in
dem betrachteten Zeitraum bejahten diese Frage. Mit den Produkten, die nur mit Hilfe
der öffentlichen Forschung zustande kamen, wurden 1995 allerdings weniger als 5 %
des gesamten Umsatzes mit neuen Produkten gemacht. Der Technologietransfer von
den öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen wird dabei entscheidend von den eigenen
FuE-Aktivitäten der Unternehmen begünstigt. Sie sind nötig um die wissenschaftlichen
Ergebnisse im Unternehmen in marktgerechte Innovationen umzusetzen. Dagegen
wirkt sich die räumliche Nähe zu Forschungseinrichtungen, die unter dem Stichwort
regionale High-Tech-Agglomerationen diskutiert wird, nicht auf den Technologietrans-
fer aus.
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Abstract
This paper deals with the effects of publicly funded research at universities, poly-
technics and federal research labs on industrial innovations in Germany. We dis-
cuss the characteristics of companies that benefit from the findings of public re-
search institutions. In questioning 2,300 companies we found that less than one
tenth of product or process innovating firms introduced innovations between 1993
and 1995 that would not have been developed without public research. These new
products amount to approximately 5 percent of all new product sales. Regressions
show that firms’ own R&D support the ability to absorb the findings of public re-
search and turn them into innovations. Contrary to the widely held opinion that
proximity to public research institutions does promote collaboration between
firms and public research and increase the amount of received knowledge spill-
overs, we found no higher probability of publicly supported innovations for firms
in Germany that are located near universities or polytechnics.
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11. Introduction
Since Arrow’s (1962) famous address at an NBER-conference in 1960, it is commonly
believed that the incentives for private investment in R&D are below the social opti-
mum because of the public good character of knowledge or what we now call knowl-
edge spillover effects. Beside the low appropriability of R&D-expenditure in basic re-
search, it is assumed that small firms which operate in niche markets cannot afford
large R&D-labs. Even large firms, mostly risk-averse and short-term oriented, would
not bear the large investments necessary because of indivisibility and high uncertainty.
In addition, firms are constrained to financing their R&D-projects by information
asymmetries in financial markets (Harhoff, 1998). In sum, failure in financial and
technology markets, indivisibility and economies of scale in R&D add up to a private
under-investment in R&D.1 It is suggested that the government should finance research
at public research institutions in order to attain the socially optimal R&D investment.2
The findings of publicly funded research are expected to be subsequently used by pri-
vate businesses for industrial innovations. It follows that benefits of publicly funded
research must be qualified against its cost. As this is the main justification for public
funds for research at public research labs, economists and politicians are interested in
assessing the real economic impact of publicly funded research.
The economics of public knowledge production can be divided into three basic means:
Education (human capital), research, and consultancy. Support for innovations of pri-
vate firms is only one of its missions, but it is achievable by all three means, since
knowledge transfer from research institutions to private firms flows through many
channels. New knowledge generated by public research is transferred to the industry by
publication of research papers, R&D contracts or R&D-cooperation with private com-
panies. Informal personal contacts and the hiring of researchers from public institu-
tions are more frequently used. Mainly US-universities are also known for their sum-
mer seminars for scientists and engineers of R&D firm labs or for business executives.
It is usually suggested that public research falls short of the full impact it could or
should have. In Germany, like in other countries, inefficiencies in the transfer of tech-
nology and lack of orientation towards the commercialisation of scientific results are
predominantly made responsible for ineffective public research and not the quality of
research in terms of scientific performance.3 It could be argued that on the one hand
government funds research, while on the other it fails to set an incentive for scientists
to support commercialisation, when solely evaluated by their scientific performance.
Instead, technology transfer requires active participation of the inventor in the com-
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 Estimations for the US of the annual social rate of return to R&D by the empirical literature vary
between 20 and 100 percent (Nadiri, 1993). After reviewing the empirical literature Jones and
Williams (1997) conclude that the R&D spent by private firms might only be a quarter of what is
socially optimal.
2
 For a discussion of the basic economic idea for public research see Leyden and Link (1991b).
3
 For an assessment of scientific performance and marketability of publicly funded research insti-
tutes in Germany see BMBF (1998).
2mercialisation phase of innovations. Jensen and Thursby (1998) delineate how techno-
logy transfer from public research institutions is ineffective if faculty members have no
incentives to devote effort to the innovation after the invention has been licensed to a
firm.
For economists public basic research is supposed to enlarge the knowledge base and
thus enhance opportunities of private firms to innovate rather than to generate innova-
tions apart from private business (Nelson, 1986, Dasgupta, David, 1994). Particularly
in science-based technologies like biotechnology, academic science might yield the
highest economic reward. Yet, scholars of industrial innovation history mainly disagree
with the traditional idea that science leads to technological applications. They argue
instead that science is only occasionally used in the innovation process and that it in-
teracts with technological progress (Kline, Rosenberg, 1986). In the interaction of sci-
ence and technology, Brooks (1994) suggests that technology is at least of equal im-
portance for science as science is for technology. Stephan (1996) adds more evidence
to the endogenous character of academic research. First, scientists get their inspiration
from collaboration with firms and select highly profitable technological fields where
relative salaries are high and second, successful firms support academic research and
that government support for science reflects the well-being of the economy. Even more
radically Kealey (1998) pleads for the irrelevance of public science to technological
progress, today as well as in the past. Only applied research tied closely to product or
process development can benefit industrial innovations. On the other hand, empirical
observation show that technology can increasingly be related to science. For instance,
Narin et al. (1997) show that patents increasingly refer to papers of scientific journals.
What seems to be true, however, is that technology transfer between public research
institutions and private business is most successful if it is embedded in targeted and
well managed collaborative research projects (e.g. Bloedon, Stokes, 1994). This is re-
flected by the management literature on technology transfer focussing on the relation-
ship management to public research (e.g. Gemuenden, Walter, 1997). The pipeline-
model of new knowledge from publicly funded science spilling over to companies as a
public good could be considered as ineffective and obsolete.
The question we will address in the third chapter is: Can the contribution of public re-
search to industrial innovations be identified and traced back to their source by inno-
vating companies? Although there are attempts to assess the economic benefits of
technology transfer from public research and how technology transfer should be man-
aged in companies and in public research institutions to make the best commercial use
out of public research, little is known about the quantitative impact of public research
on industrial innovations.4 Some progress has been made in determining factors that
affect technology transfer from public research institutions to companies, but a quanti-
tative measurement of how many innovations have been enabled by public research
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 Attempts for an assessment of the benefits of pure science were already made in the projects
Traces and Hindsight and by Gibons and Johnston (1974), see Martin and Salter (1996) for a re-
view of these studies, which show that innovations which are based on pure science exist. How-
ever, these studies lack representative quantities.
3seems to be an odd task. So far only Mansfield (1991) has tackled this question by
asking a sample of major companies about product and process innovations, which
would have not been developed in the absence of public research. Other studies detect
the impact of public research indirectly by estimating the correlation between public
research and innovation activity over regional. In this approach a regional coincidence
of public research and innovations measured as the number of innovations or patents -
is interpreted as regional spillovers from public research (Jaffe 1989, Acs, Audretsch,
Feldman, 1992).
The study starts following the approach of Mansfield (1991) and, in a second step, ex-
amines the assumption of the regional spillover-pool approach that regional closeness
between firms and knowledge source stimulates technology transfer. The prime aim of
our study is to assess the economic justification for publicly funded research that di-
rectly supports industrial innovations which otherwise would not be developed by pri-
vate businesses.5 Secondly, we want to identify the type of public research as well as
firms most likely to accomplish the public objective. Finally, we will pursue the ques-
tion of whether closeness of firms and research institutions has a positive effect on
commercialisation of findings of public research.
The current state of the public research infrastructure in Germany cannot be under-
stood without looking at how public research is embedded in the German socio-
political system. After discussing the historical evolution of the rational for the institu-
tions of publicly funded research in Germany we present results of a survey of about
2,300 companies in the manufacturing sector. Firms were asked the question of Mans-
field (1991) whether they had recently introduced innovations, which would not have
been developed in the absence of public research. In addition, we asked firms with
public research based innovations to cite the most important public knowledge source.
In the fourth chapter we discuss the features of firms with these public science-based
innovations. In locating firms and cited research institutions we can include the effect
of the distance between these two organisations on the propensity to adopt knowledge
spillovers from public research.
2. Publicly Funded Research in Germany
2.1 The Institutional Structure in Germany
Germany posseses a diverse range of public research institutions which are committed
to different means and technology transfer channels. The publicly funded R&D-
infrastructure in Germany can been subdivided into three groups: Universities, poly-
technics, and non-university research. Looking at the public research infrastructure, at
first glance it seems that Arrow’s hypothesis of under-investment in private R&D and
spillover effects has received the most ardent support in Germany. In the 1990s federal
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 Of course, there are other reasons for publicly funded research especially for basic research like
cultural richness, education, national defence and support for underdeveloped nations, etc., which
we will not address in this paper.
4and state governments in Germany have spent about 25 billion DM per year for R&D,
half of which goes to universities and polytechnics and half to public research labs. In
addition, DM 5 billion is directly given to private businesses as project-related subsi-
dies for R&D. We estimate the number of (full- and part-time) researchers within natu-
ral sciences, engineering and medical faculties of publicly funded institutions at 122
thousand in 1993. Of course, scientists at universities and polytechnics (Fachhochschu-
len), which make up 70 percent of this figure, are occupied with teaching and some of
them spend only a little time on research. The R&D-share of their work varies between
30 percent (clinics) and 60 percent (engineering) for universities and drops to 5 percent
for polytechnics (Hetmeier, 1998). The full-time equivalent of public scientists is only
50 percent of the head-count. However, statistics collected by the OECD (1997) show
that Germany spends more on R&D in the higher education and government related
sectors as a percentage of GDP than most of the other OECD countries including the
US, if the defence related budget is excluded.
Germany’s public research infrastructure was not built up from the scratch to fulfil the
economic goal set by the hypothesis of private under-investment in R&D.6 It evolved
in a complex environment characterised by the traditional Central European view of
natural science as a value in itself and by the demand from industry, by the inertia of
public institutions and tensions between federal and state responsibility for education
and research. Universities have a long tradition of research in natural and medical sci-
ence reaching back to the middle ages. Universities of social and natural science are
known mostly for teaching and basic research without aiming at any commercialisa-
tion. Their main transfer channel seems to be the publication of research results. Their
share of research grants from industry remain low, between 1-15 percent of project-
related research funds from external sources, meaning that only up to 3 percent of all
research expenditures are financed by industry (Wissenschaftsrat, 1993). In contrast,
technical universities have a long tradition of industry-related research. Similar to the
US (Rosenberg, Nelson, 1994), technical universities have been formed since the last
century to enforce inventions and technical applications of scientific findings but have
subsequently focussed on basic research (Keck, 1993). They receive up to 40 percent
of external research funds from industry, though it is less than 10 percent of all their
research spending. As the public law impose some restrictions on technology transfer,
universities have established legally independent external institutes in order to gain
administrative flexibility (Abramson et al., 1997, p. 288). In 1993 these institutes made
up about 4 percent of all research at universities, and this share has been increasing
rapidly in the 1990s.
Polytechnics (Fachhochschulen) have a special role in Germany. Often, they are spe-
cialised in the same technical fields as local businesses and are supposed to support
small and medium sized firms through consultancy and the supply of graduates. Poly-
technics focus mainly on education, but also conduct research albeit on a much smaller
scale than universities. The first polytechnics emerged from engineering schools and
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 For a more detailed description of academic and non-academic public research institutions in Ger-
many, see BMBF (1996), Keck (1993), Abramson et al. (1997) and Schimank (1990).
5were complemented later by a number of newly established ones. They are now wide-
spread within Germany and have gained a reputation for down-to-earth research and
applicable engineering know-how, compensating the shortcomings of universities
which are oriented towards basic research.
2.2 The Development of Non-Academic Public Research
While tradition-bounded universities offered limited potential for ambitious research
policy, additional research labs were established by the federal or local governments to
fill gaps in the wide spectrum of technology transfer to private business. The history of
publicly funded research centres in Germany that have been established in addition to
universities goes back to the last century. It is typical of these institutes that, when
founded, their main mission was to support the national economy. Subject to a few ex-
ceptions, the justification for their establishment was to either maintain the interna-
tional competitiveness of private companies or to close a German technological gap to
other nations, mainly to the US. In 1887, the first public research agency, the Physika-
lisch-Technische Reichsanstalt, was founded under the initiation of Werner von
Siemens, one of the first German industrialists (Cahan, 1989). In 1911 the Kaiser-
Wilhelm-Society was established with strong financial and ideological support of the
German chemical and heavy industries. Some of its institutes were almost industrial
research labs (Ritter, 1992, Johnson, 1990). After World War II, the institutes were
reunited in the Max-Planck-Society (MPG) and became quite independent from indus-
try, from were they now receive less than 1 percent of their total budget as research
grants. Over time the MPG with its 60 institutes employing about 3,000 scientists in
natural and medical sciences shifted away from industry-related research to basic re-
search (Mayntz, 1991, p.53) and became concentrated on biology, physics and astron-
omy, but they are still strong in chemistry, material and medical science as well.
Together with the institutes of the Fraunhofer-Society the Max-Planck-Institutes are
designed to complement research at universities and are often located within their
proximity, even being headed by university professors. The Fraunhofer-Society (FhG),
founded in 1949 in Bavaria as a geological institute, was soon transformed into an or-
ganisation of institutes for industry-like applied research. After a difficult start with the
research community, which saw its public and private funds waning and therefore op-
posed the FhG, the latter was only able to survive in the late 1950s when the Defence
Ministry fostered the institutes as their main research contractor. With the defence re-
lated source of funds at hand, the Fraunhofer-Society was deliberately joined by other
already established public and private research institutes. In 1968, it was fully inte-
grated in the research funding programme of the Federal Research Ministry and the
share of defence related research decreased to less than 40 percent in the mid-1970s.
Over time, the Fraunhofer-Institutes established themselves as the leading contract re-
search institutions for industrial innovations in Germany. Its 47 institutes are compara-
tively small and regionally dispersed. Altogether they employ only 3,300 scientists and
engineers. Whereas the MPG and big science labs receive full public funding, most of
the Fraunhofer-Institutes receive a small share of their budgets as non-project-related
public funds (about 40 percent). That is why they are keen to acquire research funds
6from industry and through public research programmes, each funding an additional
30 percent of the total budget.
In the 1990s, MPG and FhG together receive public funds of about three quarters of
what the federal science centres receive, which is about 16 percent of the gross amount
of Germany’s public R&D spending. The history of the federal big science labs started
in the early 1950s with the promising prospects of nuclear energy, which was seen as
the key to technological competitiveness. The nuclear euphoria was politically empha-
sised by the new Ministry of Nuclear Science, which orchestrated the public funding of
nuclear research in big science labs. Their mission was to build nuclear research reac-
tors, developed and operated in close collaboration with German industry, which also
supplied financial resources. Competition between the states and their responsibility
for research policy led to the establishment of five large research centres. These labs
were finally financed by federal funds after the industry gradually lowered its financial
commitment while developing its own indigenous technology or taking licenses of fo-
reign reactor designs. For a while, the strategy of the German nuclear science pro-
gramme seemed unsettled and was refocused several times, lastly on high temperature
and fast breeder reactors which were finally abandoned in the 1990s. Though the fed-
eral research programme at first glance led to an internationally competitive German
nuclear industry, after reviewing the German public reactor programme Keck (1980)
recaps that its commercial benefit was marginal. Actually, there was little contribution
by government research centres to the only commercially successful reactor type, the
light-water reactor. Parallel to the phasing out of nuclear research programmes and
even before the downturn of public support for nuclear energy in the late 1970s, the
nuclear research centres diversified their activities from nuclear energy to nuclear
waste management and unrelated new technologies like microelectronics, computer
technologies and environmental science. For instance, the Geestacht research centre
shifted to marine research after abandoning its first mission as a nuclear powered ship.
Despite the vanishing importance of nuclear science, all these big-science labs still
operate at full steam.
Besides these well known organisations there is a bunch of larger and smaller publicly
financed research institutes and federal agencies with research activities like material
testing, pharmaceutical approval or defence technology assessment. Though the main
purpose does not always consist of technology transfer, they could still have some ef-
fect on industrial innovation. The so-called ‘blue list’ institutes are financed equally
through funds of the federal and host state governments; research grants from industry
are scarce. They employ about 5,000 scientists and engineers in the natural, engineer-
ing and medical sciences. The first public research institution mentioned, the Physika-
lisch-Technische Reichsanstalt, is now one of several federal agencies with R&D ac-
tivities in Germany, employing about 7,500 scientists and engineers in total R&D. In
addition, some institutes which are supposed to be supporting local industry are funded
exclusively by the federal states.
72.3 Policy Shifts
In the mid-1960s science policy moved towards federal responsibilities. The Ministry
for Nuclear Science was renamed into the Research Ministry, and new public research
centres were established. Federal government intended to influence the direction of
state dominated research policy in Germany through big science labs which were fin-
anced almost entirely by federal funds and the Fraunhofer-Institutes. Primary concerns
stated in official statements in favour of public research centres focussed on the tech-
nological gap between Germany and the US in certain technological fields (Keck,
1976, p. 137, Schimank, 1990). Research planning became the key word of science
policy (Tritschler, 1990). The dominance of the US-aircraft industry fostered by de-
fence-related subsidies led to the convergence of the aerospace industry in Europe and
publicly funded research at the national laboratory of space and aviation (DLR). It is
now the largest of the big science centres in Germany. The other most obvious tech-
nological gap to be closed was that of the computer industry. For this task, the "Gesell-
schaft fuer Mathematik und Datenverarbeitung" (GMD) was founded in 1968, though
specialised in computational mathematics. Public departments were designated as the
first users of demonstration projects developed by the GMD (Wiegand, 1990). Later,
other government research centres were established which focused more on non-
industrial research like the AWI for polar research or the DESY in Hamburg, a large
electron collider ring.
After the short period of the Brandt-administration, which shifted policy priorities to-
wards the prevention of side effects of new technologies and to increasing the quality
of life, the objective of public research was again refocused on economic motivations
under chancellor Schmidt in the mid-1970s marked by calls for more technology trans-
fer from public research to industry through close collaboration with the industry (Rit-
ter, 1992). Technology policy was thus seen as an active industrial policy (Hauff,
Scharf, 1975). In the 1980s, it became officially recognised that expectations of inten-
sive technology transfer from federal funded research centres would not be met. The
mission of big science centres then shifted from development of large technical sys-
tems to the study of aspects of large technical systems (Federal Government cited by
Ritter, 1992, p. 107). With the liquidation of the reactor programmes (high-temperature
and fast breeder reactors) the labs finally lost their large scale industrial innovation
targets, which, in economic terms, were substituted by ill-defined socio-economic
complexes like environment, energy and health. Besides basic research, they should
generally promote further developments of technologies in these fields including aero-
space (BMBF, 1996). They also lost their clear distinction from basic science at uni-
versities. Since then, their capabilities of generating industrial innovation have been
regarded as limited, achieving at most spin-off innovations. Again, their public funds
have not been dwindling. One reason for their everlasting survival is that universities
and polytechnics are placed within the responsibility of state governments. The Max-
Planck-Society with some of their directors being Noble prize winners vehemently in-
sists on its independence, leaving government research centres as the main vehicle for
federal science and technology policy.
82.4 The Divorce Between Basic and Applied Research
From this overview of the German public research infrastructure, we made clear that
the establishment of public research was mainly justified with economic benefits. After
world war II the distinction between basic and applied science emerged not only in the
US (Brooks, 1996) but in most other industrialised countries as a paradigm of public
research (Stokes, 1997). Basic research, which is in Vannevar Bush’s words performed
without premature thought of practical use, became seen almost as the equivalent of
the private under-investment in R&D. In Germany the separation of pure and applied
science was traditionally institutionalised in universities of technical and natural sci-
ences. But it was not until the integration of the Fraunhofer-Society as the third pillar
of the German public research system, that the division between basic and applied re-
search was officially carried out in the non-academic public research sector as well
(Hohn, 1989). In 1973, the then renamed Federal Ministry of Research and Technology
finally laid down the division of labour between MPG, which subsequently totally
abandoned applied research and concentrated on basic research, big science labs,
aimed at industry-oriented basic research, and the FhG-Institutes, responsible for ap-
plied research through contract-research. In effect, only the institutes of the Fraun-
hofer-Society have a clear mission for industrial innovations, all other publicly funded
institutions are directed towards basic research with the prospect of spin-off innova-
tions. For example, the MPG as Abramson et al. (1997, p. 312) concludes, always em-
phasizes technology transfer, but it never views the success of transfer as a criterion of
evaluation.
Herein lays the main public criticism of the current state of public research (Stokes,
1997). It is what Shapley and Roy (1985) call the „myth of the divorce between basic
research and applications“: that basic research has to be separated from applied re-
search to yield valuable results. Although justified mainly by economic reasoning,
large parts of public research seems to retreat to vague long term effects of basic
knowledge not amenable to testing. If there is no inherent separation of basic and ap-
plied research or if science does not lead automatically to technical applications, it is
not enough for public research to concentrate on pure basic research to fulfil its eco-
nomic objective. By participating in publicly funded projects with industry in the
1990s, even big science in Germany is moving back towards active development of
industrial applications. Yet, despite the gradual transition of public research institutes,
they remain in the crossfire of industrial critics due to the lack of efficiency of technol-
ogy transfer. We now turn to the view of the firms and try to assess the economic bene-
fits of the different institutions of public research by examining industrial innovations,
which have been enabled by public research.
3. Public Research Underlying Industrial Innovations
Most of the empirical studies of public research on industrial activities try to verify
effects indirectly without identifying what channels were used mostly. The analysis
does not identify the channels of technology transfer either, but it defines exactly the
effects of public research on industrial innovation. As already mentioned, the motiva-
9tion for public research is that private firms would not invest in research because they
could not fully appropriate the profit of the findings albeit the research would lead to
useful industrial innovations. To identify the kind of research in place for omitted pri-
vate activities and to distinguish it from pure outsourcing of private R&D tasks to
public research institutions, we have to stipulate that the company would not have done
the R&D on their own if it had not been funded and performed by the government.
In the fourth year of the annual innovation survey7 conducted by the ZEW in 1996 the
companies were asked almost the same question Mansfield (1991) used in his study. In
our survey firms were asked whether they have introduced an innovation between 1993
and 1995 that could not have been developed without the support of research institu-
tions. In the postal questionnaire the question was placed directly after the companies
had to estimate the share of sales with new or significantly improved products and the
cost reduction of new processes introduced since 1993. The companies were to judge,
„whether any of these innovations could not have been developed or only with a delay
of at least one year in the absence of recent research at universities and other public
research institutions„ and what share of sales these innovations covered in 1995. The
qualifications were implemented to exclude the outsourcing of R&D projects which
could have been done in-house as well but at higher costs.8 The share of companies
which introduced innovations which could not have been developed in the absence of
public research says not much about the importance of these innovations. To quantify
the impact of public research on industrial innovation the firms that had introduced
new products between 1993-1996 were subsequently asked to estimate the share of
sales of these new products. To trace back the academic support of industrial innova-
tion we finally asked the companies to name not only the group of academic source but
also single institutions. The distribution over specific research institutions will be dis-
cussed in the third subsection of this chapter.
3.1 Firms with Public Research-Based Innovations
Slightly less than 9 percent of all firms which introduced product or process innova-
tions between 1993 and 1996 received the support of public research for their innova-
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 The Mannheim Innovation Panel is part of the community innovation survey (CIS), a joint effort of
Eurostat and EU Commission to collect firm-level data on input and output on innovation. All ta-
bles of the descriptive part show expanded figures. See the data appendix for the data description.
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 Of course, a postal question is prone for misunderstandings. Unlike Mansfield (1991) we did not
specify just how far back in time the word ‘recent’ actually means. The only purpose of ‘recent’ is
to prevent views of the like that everything is originally based on progress in academic science like
microelectronic is based on the quantum theory or radio telecommunication on Maxwell’s laws.
Mansfield (1991) himself notes that data was obtained after considerable discussions with respon-
dents. Yet, we are convinced through a dozen personal interviews we made with the heads of R&D
departments, who were predominantly asked in the survey, that the question is quite comprehensi-
ble and that the answers are not heavily biased towards over- or under estimation of public re-
search. See data appendix for a further discussion.
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tions (table 1). Looking only at the R&D-intensive industries9 the figure rises to 16
percent. Taking into account that the base group comprises all firms with 5 or more
employees and which has used at least one new machine during that time10, the share
of firms with public-science-based innovations is rather high and exceeds the share of
companies which rate public research as very important for their innovations.
Table 1
Share of companies with innovations which could not have been developed without recent public
research (%) between 1993-1996
Industry Firms with pub-
lic-research-based
innovations
of which:
Firms with
public-research
based product
Firms with
publ.-research-
based process
to all product
or process-
innovators
Products
only
Processes
only
Products
and proc-
esses
innovations to
all product-
innovators
innovations to
all process-
innovators
Manufacturing 8.5 5.5 1.5 1.5 7.9 3.4
 R&D intensive 15.9 12.0 2.4 1.5 14.0 5.2
 non-R&D-intens. 6.2 3.5 1.3 1.4 5.7 2.9
Source: ZEW Mannheim Innovation Panel
Public research had a much higher impact on new products than on new processes.
This is no surprise, since a lower share of private R&D-expenditure is pointed at proc-
ess innovation. In non-R&D-intensive industries, 42 percent of the firms introducing
innovations with the help of public research developed new processes. In the R&D-
intensive industries the share was only 29 percent. This could simply reflect higher
incentives in the non-R&D-intensive sector for price-cutting process innovations rela-
tive to new products than in R&D-intensive industries. The overall share of firms with
publicly backed process innovations, though, is still a bit lower in non-R&D-intensive
industries.
The second part of the question asked for the sources of public research which were
most important for the development of innovations (table 2).
                                                
9
 In our study we use the classification of BMBF (1998). R&D intensive industries spend more than
3 percent of sales for R&D. This group is further subdivided into advanced technologies and cut-
ting edge technology with the latter subgroup spending more than 8 percent of sales for R&D.
R&D intensive industries include chemicals, machinery, electrical machinery, computers, medical,
precision and optical instruments, motor vehicles and the aerospace industry. Within these indus-
tries pharmaceuticals, agri-chemicals, telecommunication equipment, electronic components and
aircraft are cutting edge technologies.
10
 The OECD-definition of innovation was used in the survey. It includes products and processes new
to the firm (OECD, 1996). Thus, even some imitations and the adaptation of new machinery are
innovations.
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Table 2
Distribution of sources without which innovations from 1993-1996 could not have been developed
(%)
Sourcea Firms with public- of which:
research-based
innovations
products only processes only products and
processes
all 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
  Universities 40.7 45.8 24.7 38.2
  Polytechnics 17.1 14.8 17.5 25.7
  Other public labs 40.0 45.4 45.5 12.7
  no assignment 20.3 13.3 28.6 38.2
a
 Multiple answers possible
 Source: ZEW Mannheim Innovation Panel
Out of the three groups of public research institutions and universities were cited
equally often. Less than one fifth mentioned the polytechnics. Compared to their low
research budget this turns out to be a surprisingly high figure. A substantial share of
the firms did not specify the particular source of support, either because the respondent
did not know where the research support originally came from or because he did not
want to name the source, for it represents crucial information for the firm.
Looking at the size distribution of firms (table 3), we find that larger companies give
priority to universities, which are normally much better equipped than polytechnics,
whereas smaller firms receive relatively more support from polytechnics and, somehow
surprisingly, from publicly financed research labs. It is possible that universities dis-
criminate against small firms in favour of large firms because larger firms are more
attractive in terms of funding and proximity to basic research. It does not support the
common view that small firms rely mostly on polytechnics. Compared to polytechnics,
universities still play a role in innovation for small companies.
Table 3
Size distribution of firms with innovations introduced between 1993-1996 which could not have been
developed in the absence of public research (%)
Sourcea Total of which by number of employees
5-50 50-500 500 and more
all 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
  Universities 40.7 31.7 50.8 48.2
  Polytechnics 17.1 24.5 8.3 16.5
  Other public labs 40.0 43.4 35.7 41.2
  no assignment 20.3 12.8 28.4 31.2
a
 Multiple answers possible
 Source: ZEW Mannheim Innovation Panel
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3.2 Sales of Public-Research-Based-Innovations
The share of sales with new products introduced to the market in the 3 year period
between 1993 and 1996 is about one third with few differences between small and
large firms (table 4). The share of the public-research-based products of all firms that
introduced products with the help of public research is one quarter of all sales with
new products. Once able to transform findings of public research into innovations,
smaller firms tend to cover a higher share of sales with publicly supported innovations
than larger companies. We have two explanations for this. First, smaller firms have
fewer products in their portfolio and given the length of the product-life-cycle does not
vary between small and large firms, they develop fewer innovations in a 3-year period.
Therefore, every single new product has a higher share of sales to total sales with new
products. Taking only small firms with public-research-based innovations leads to
higher shares of sales of these innovations. Secondly, smaller firms do more often
compensate a lack of basic knowledge and research abilities with partners of the public
research infrastructure than companies with large R&D labs, which more often out-
source auxiliary R&D functions or non-crucial developments, they tend to keep in-
house to prevent knowledge drains to other firms. Thus public-research-based innova-
tions of smaller firms have a higher quality and a higher impact on their sales than their
pure in-house innovations.
Table 4
Average sharea of sales of new products, which could not have
been developed in the absence of public research (%)
Number of em-
ployees
new products
to total sales
public-research-based
products to total sales
of new products
5-49 31 46
50-499 31 36
500 and more 34 22
Total 34 25
a
 weighted by total sales
Source: ZEW Mannheim Innovation Panel
The sales of public-research-based product innovations of a 3-year period can be esti-
mated at roughly DM 20 billion (table 5). That is less than 5 percent of total revenue
for new products of the manufacturing sector in Germany. Since multiple answers for
the source were possible, the sales cannot be divided between the three groups of
sources. Yet, most of these sales with research-based products can be attributed to uni-
versities, that is 78 percent of the sales with public-research-based products are from
firms, which name universities as a main source of knowledge, compared to 63 percent
for research labs and 38 percent for polytechnics. Surprisingly, slightly more sales with
public-research based products are made by firms of non-R&D-intensive industries.
The share in all new products is almost the same in R&D intensive and in non-R&D
intensive sectors. Research of polytechnics is used much more for non-R&D-intensive
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products, suggesting that high-tech sectors prefer research from universities and re-
search labs for their main product innovations.
Considering the amount of public funds of DM 25 billion or 30 percent of the gross
national R&D expenditure per year public research institutions receive, one may also
postulate that the attempt to compensate the assumed under-investment of private R&D
by public spending on research institutions generated an oversized public research in-
frastructure in Germany. This public research does not seem to yield social welfare in
form of spillovers to industrial innovations as much as it costs. This conclusion can
clearly be countered with the fact that we did not measure all effects of public research
on industrial innovations. This truly underestimates the benefit of public research on
industrial innovation on the whole. First, we did not include the savings achieved with
processes that could not have been developed without public research. It can also be
argued that the survey identified only a fraction of products where public research is
vital but not consciously recognised by the firm. While product imitations are included
in the total industry sales of new products, it is likely that most of the imitations of new
public-research-based products were not included by the imitating companies (as it
should be), simply because the imitator was not aware of the role public research
played in the development. Besides that, it is almost impossible to measure all addi-
tional effects of intermediate products like semiconductors which enable new functions
of other products.
Table 5
Estimated sales with new products introduced between 1993-1996, which would not have been devel-
oped without public research
Industry Sales of new
public-research-
as percentage
of total industry
Distribution of sourcea (in percent)
based products
Billions of DM
sales of new
products
Universities Polytechnics Other
public labs
Manufacturing 19.4 4.5 78 38 63
  R&D-intensive 9.4 4.7 69 10 68
  non-R&D-intensive 10.0 4.3 87 64 59
a
 Multiple answers possible
Source: ZEW Mannheim Innovation Panel
Secondly, the assumption of under-investment of private R&D does not need the con-
dition of firms lacking the ability to develop a new product or process mainly because
of low appropriability of knowledge or financial restrictions. Although we tried to
formulate the question as neutral as possible, it can be difficult for firms to admit in
retrospect that they would not have introduced the innovation if solely relying on their
own resources. Thirdly, public research in Germany can be useful for companies out-
side of Germany, i.e. Japanese firms have a reputation for using findings of basic re-
search in Germany and turning it into successful innovations. Fourthly, we include
only short-term effects of public research, but basic research is said to be used for in-
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dustrial innovations a fairly long time after publication. Adams (1990) finds time lags
of 10-30 years between the appearance of public research results in scientific articles
and their effect on productivity. Many firms do co-operate with public research institu-
tions on strategic long term research projects only with no explicit agenda of product
or process development in order to keep the core-knowledge of their innovations in-
house. These projects could also be of benefit to industries, but final effects to firm
specific new products or processes are hard to assign.
On national level, the argument for basic research is that nations can get a head start in
new technologies where markets are not developed yet and technological progress is
pushed mainly by advances in science. Nations could subsequently turn that basic
knowledge into a long-term national comparative advantage after first applications of
the new technology emerge and markets develop. Biotechnology or microelectronics
are given as examples for national advantages through science. These long-term effects
are not only hard to measure, but also disputable. First, it is not clear whether lead-
applications always occur where science is most advanced. It could also occur where
users benefit most from the new technology. It would be more effective to transfer sci-
entific knowledge between advanced nations than to run user-producer-interaction,
which is often essential for the commercialisation of new technologies (Lundvall,
1988) over a long distance. The second argument against this point is that progress in
science is often pushed by technological inventions. In line with the aim of the study
we excluded innovations which were developed with knowledge from public research
production but which were developed by private business otherwise, even if public
research would have been conducted.
As it has been said before, there are other technology transfer channels to support in-
dustrial innovations which are not likely to be included in our new product measure-
ment, like scientists working in private R&D labs using their knowledge stock they
built up in public labs. It was also often observed that public R&D does stimulate pri-
vate R&D (Leyden, Link, 1991a). The innovations derived from the additional private
R&D should also be taken into account as effects of public research. Keeping this in
mind, these estimates are a step to evaluate the short-term direct effect of public re-
search on industrial product innovation.
3.4 Distribution of Public Research Sources
A further question is where exactly the contribution to industrial innovation came
from. Support may be distributed evenly among universities and other publicly fi-
nanced research institutes, reflecting only the distribution of research staff, or con-
centrating on particular institutions which turn out to be more effective. Mansfield and
Lee (1996) seem to support the common view of the American academic research in-
frastructure that mostly privately financed elite universities such as MIT, Harvard and
Stanford, which are world leaders in science and technology, attract the highest re-
search grants from businesses, thus becoming most decisive in industrial innovations -
whereas the majority of academic institutions display a rather mediocre performance
when it comes to valuable research results which may be used for high-tech industrial
innovation.
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To trace back the academic support of industrial innovation we asked the companies to
further name public research lab, university or polytechnic that was most important for
their innovations. About 129 companies out of 169 that tagged at least one kind of
source could or were not reluctant to give the name of the most supportive institutions.
These respondents cited 196 public research institutions altogether, of which 120 were
different ones, which means that on average every company named a different source.
At first glance the variety of citations suggests that there are plenty of different sources
in Germany that generate valuable information for industrial innovation and that aca-
demic support is not excessively concentrated. A closer look shows that the distribu-
tion is actually almost the same as in the Mansfield study. The top four research institu-
tions received almost 30 percent and the top ten got 43 percent of the citations but em-
ploy only 23 percent of the scientific staff. Thus, academic support in Germany seems
to be just as much concentrated on single institutions as in the US.
As expected, the institutes of the Fraunhofer-Society were cited most frequently.11
With few exceptions these institutes were cited generally, so that the particular institute
could not be identified. Since the Fraunhofer-Society as a whole is as large as a univer-
sity or one of the large federal science centres, we treat its institutes as one institution.
It corroborates the first presumption that the institutes of the Fraunhofer-Society play
the dominant role within the group of institutions other than universities and polytech-
nics, which in the previous chapter proved to be effective regarding industrial innova-
tions. Not surprisingly, large technical universities with engineering faculties were
cited most, leaving traditional universities which focused on natural science far be-
yond. The most cited university was Aachen, which is also the only German university
cited in the Mansfield-study by US companies. This clearly confirms the superior role
of Aachen university as an academic supporter of industrial innovations. However, the
list of citations in the appendix simply document the firms’ responses. Since the sam-
ple of firms in the innovation questionnaire is comparatively small, the citation list
should in no manner be considered as a ranking of research institutions in Germany.
Only one institute of the Max-Planck-Society was mentioned by one company and in-
deed just one albeit the largest of the federal research-labs for big-science were cited at
all: the German research laboratory for space and aviation (DLR). In relation to their
size this is a rather disappointing result, even though, the questionnaire was only sent
to a sample of firms. Together with what was said in chapter two the absence of cita-
tions of non-academic research other than Fraunhofer-Institutes suggests that further
efforts to focus on industrial innovations and to intensify technology transfer to the
industry are needed in order to fulfil the economic justification for their public funding.
                                                
11
 See table A1 in the appendix for the list of universities and research lab that were cited by at least
two firms. This result is not a ranking of single institutions and should not be taken as such. It is
derived from a sample of all companies only and not from a census of firms that worked together
with public research institutions. Moreover, as a result of the design of the question we cannot
compare the importance of a single institution of one group with one of another group. It should
only give a further hint of the distribution of academic sources within each group, that are most
valuable for companies’ innovation activities. The frequent reference of East German universities
is biased by the overrepresentation of East German firms in the sample.
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On an international level the result is rather dull. Despite the EU-Commission’s sup-
port of Pan-European collaboration between companies and public research institutions
and cross-border networking, only three foreign institutions, of which one was Euro-
pean, were cited as being important for innovation by German firms. This suggests that
proximity to public research, either physical or cultural, might be an essential determi-
nant of technology transfer to private business. We will address the question whether
spillover knowledge from public research is effected by regional distance together with
firm specific determinants of effective technology transfer in the next chapter.
4. Effects of Firm Size, R&D and Distance to Public Research Institutions
4.1 R&D Activity and Size of Firms
There is rich empirical evidence that the usage of external knowledge by firms is no
substitute for own generation of knowledge. Rather, external and internal knowledge
act as complements. The opportunity to use knowledge from basic research presents a
strong incentive for firms to do R&D on their own in order to be able to adopt external
knowledge in their own innovation production. The more firms are committed to their
own R&D activities the more they use external knowledge. The complementary rela-
tionship between internal and external knowledge holds especially for public and pri-
vate R&D (Leyden, Link, 1991a). Berman (1990) finds that firms even raised their
R&D-budgets after co-operating with universities. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest
that firms must build up an absorptive capacity with own R&D activities to effectively
incorporate external knowledge into new products and processes. In particular, public
research seldom leads to ready-to-produce innovations. What actually gets transferred
is knowledge that enables firms to develop a new product or process (Bloedon, Stokes,
1994, p. 44). Thus, we expect that firms with higher R&D expenditures per sales have
a higher propensity to receive knowledge spillovers from public research.
For years, economists have pursued the question of whether large firms tend to be
more innovative than small firms. Fascinated by large R&D labs many succumb to the
view that large companies generate the innovations derived from basic research, while
small firms rather imitate and thus disseminate innovations within industry. A closer
examination led to the finding that small firms are sometimes much more innovative in
relation to their size than large ones (Acs, Audretsch, 1990, Harhoff et al., 1996). The
size of the firm includes many factors determining its behaviour. Size is rather a proxy
for factors that correlate with size than the explaining variable itself. It is a proxy for
scale effects of knowledge production, the capacity to specialise functions and to per-
form applied research as well. If innovation output cannot be measured in relation to
size, the size variable also includes the higher innovation output of larger firms. As
discussed above, the possibility to receive spillover knowledge from public research
should increase with size because of increasing abilities to communicate and co-
operate with public research institutions. From the perspective of the public scientists
large firms could be more attractive to co-operate with, since large firms offer more
complementing resources and funds, reputation and future job opportunities.
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4.2 Regional Spillover
Studies of industrial agglomerations and firm formation in high-tech industries stress
the importance of proximity of private and public R&D activities for spillover-effects.
Case studies of Silicon Valley, Boston Route 128 (Saxenian, 1994) and the Cambridge
science park (Castells, Hall, 1994) represent a starting point: They identify a regional
innovation milieu which is characterized by intensive collaboration, informal contacts
and technology transfer within the business sector (e.g. Camagni, 1991). The innova-
tion milieu is seen to foster the commercialisation of new technologies and firm for-
mation in high-tech-industries. These regional examples always have universities as a
core which generate spillovers received predominantly by companies located in the
same area. Technology transfer is seen to be most effective within informal communi-
cation networks. The main explanation for effects of proximity is that if research out-
puts cannot be reduced to formal sets of codified instructions it can not be transferred
over long distances and requires face-to-face-communication (Foray, Mairesse, 1997).
Even video-conferencing, widely used by multinational companies for global new
product development, could hardly substitute personal communication (Nohria, Eccles,
1992, McDonough, Kahn, 1996). The incentive to work together with public research
institutions should be higher for firms that are located closely to these public institutes,
since the cost of travelling between collaborators increases with distance between
them. A second argument is that there should be more occasions for informal commu-
nication between scientists of private firms and public institutions, who live in the
same region. Moreover, collaboration between scientists often begins informally and
result from casual conversation (Katz, 1994, p. 32). Informal communication leads to
mutual trust, and trust raises the propensity to co-operate in R&D-projects, since co-
operations always increase the risk of know-how leaking out (Granovetter, 1985,
Beise, Spielkamp, 1996). Therefore, more collaboration between nearby partners than
between more distant ones should be observed. Local politics prefer the theses of re-
search institutions being mostly beneficial for the regional industry and devoting their
work to building up public research institutions in industrially underdeveloped regions.
On a broader statistical basis a positive regional interaction effect between academic
and private R&D-activities was supported for the US by the work of Jaffe (1989), Acs,
Audretsch and Feldman (1992), Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) and Anselin,
Varga and Acs (1997) with patent, patent citation and single innovation counting as
innovation indicators.12 Yet, there is ample criticism of the generalisation of the Sili-
con Valley story and the dominance of regional over interregional effects of public
research (Bania, Eberts, Fogarty, 1993). First, direct measurements and the information
on mechanism of the technology transfer from research institutions are scarce, and it is
not clear what exactly caused the agglomeration effect. All measured effects could still
be the effects of a regional market for skilled labor and spin-offs and not of technology
transfer and intensive communication between local researchers. Spin-off firms are
more frequent within research intensive regions, because of the immobility of scientist
and engineers of research institutions that become entrepreneurs. Jaffe et al. (1993)
                                                
12
 For an overview of studies on regional effects of universities see Anselin, Varga and Acs (1997).
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admit that it is still not known what spillover mechanisms are at work. Contrary to an-
ecdotal evidence for informal collaboration and face-to-face-contacts in high-tech re-
gions, Audretsch and Stephan (1996) find that even in the case of a science-based
technology like biotechnology, 70 percent of 445 identified firm-university links are
non-local. Secondly, other case studies of agglomerations did not find any form of in-
novation milieu, which is suggested to be the prerequisite of local technology transfer.
In case studies of regional high-tech-regions in Europe companies just did not collabo-
rate preferentially within their region (Castels, Hall, 1994). Thirdly, the influence of
distance seems to depend highly on the innovation behaviour of the firm. Meyer-
Krahmer (1985) suggests that for R&D-intensive and outward oriented innovating
firms distance to the source of know-how is irrelevant and quality of external technol-
ogy to be assessed is the only important factor.
There is also doubt about the applicability for Germany. Studies in the US normally
use a regional entity, that is relatively large compared to Germany, which covers a
smaller area than California.13 Germany has in addition built up a dense transportation
infrastructure, making it sometimes more convenient to travel between two metropoli-
tan areas than wangling one’s way through the traffic jam within one city. Though re-
gional policy and heavy public subsidies for science parks are common in Europe,
„Silicon valley„ seems to be a US-specific phenomenon. Sternberg (1996) notes that
there is no evidence yet for specialised industrial districts in Germany at all. Further-
more, few examples of dominant regional agglomerations around universities like the
Silicon Valley are found in Germany. Although, there is some evidence for a positive
relationship between universities and firm formation in high-tech industries (Licht,
Nerlinger, 1998), the same does not hold for R&D-co-operations. A survey of technol-
ogy transfers from the Aachen university (Fromhold-Eisebith, 1992) found most of the
companies which collaborated with the machinery faculty of the university to be lo-
cated outside the region. Indeed, only 15 percent belonged to the Aachen region and
one third were located in the southern German states of Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttem-
berg. An earlier study based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel by Beise and Spiel-
kamp (1996) showed that, although, the share of co-operations with universities in the
region exceeds that of regional customers or suppliers, only one quarter of the me-
dium-sized companies and less than 10 percent of the companies with more than 500
employees, which co-operated with universities in 1992, did so solely within their re-
gion. In addition, company surveys by Sternberg (1997), Beise and Spielkamp (1996)
and Grotz and Braun (1997) found support for the prevalence of interregional linkages
between firms and public research institutions in Germany. It seems that within Ger-
many distance did not matter much for high-tech firms. Apart from start-ups it might
be argued that German R&D performing companies lose their dependence on local
research institutions.
                                                
13
 Though Mansfield (1995) and Mansfield and Lee (1996) find support that firms are more reluctant
to support research at a college or university 1,000 or more miles away than if it were less than 100
miles. The largest distance in Germany (from the north east to the south west) is only 600 miles.
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If there is any regional bias of spillovers from public research, we would expect that
firms with public-research-based innovations to be located closer to public research
institutions on an average than other firms. Contrary to this expectation, a comparison
of the distributions of distances of scientists employed by public research to companies
of the sample shows no difference between firms with publicly supported innovations
and all firms (fig. 1). With this finding, it is hard to believe that closeness to research
institutions has an effect on the probability of public-research-based innovations. On
the other hand, we find that firms naming specific research institutions do tend to be
closer to these than to public institutions. The distribution of distances between citing
firms and cited research institutions are highly skewed towards smaller distances com-
pared to the distribution to all public scientists (fig 2). Almost one quarter of the 191
cited research institutions were located in the same county or in nearby counties not
more than 25 km away. Looking at the different types of research institutions, it be-
comes clear that polytechnics, which have been founded mainly to support local small
and medium sized firms, were named almost entirely by nearby firms as a useful know-
ledge resource (fig 3).
If we remove the polytechnics, the distribution of proximity to remaining research in-
stitutions turns out a lot more even. But also with universities and public research in-
stitutes like the ones of the Fraunhofer-Society, the majority of the cited institutes are
located inside a 100 km circle (fig. 3). We conclude that firms tend to name institutions
close by although, there is no higher probability to receive spillover knowledge from
public research by firms that are located closer to these institutions compared with
more remote firms. An explanation is that firms which decide to use external knowl-
edge, start checking public research institutions nearby for reasons of convenience and
look for more distant sources only if they fail to find any appropriate knowledge in
their own region. The average distance of spillovers depends on the selection behav-
iour of the firm and not on the regional reach of spillovers from public research.
4.3 Model Specification and Estimation
Finally, we formulate the hypothesis that the amount of spillover knowledge received
by a firm rises with the firm’s R&D-activities and the size of the firm. Our empirical
model should also confirm that firms located close to public research institutions have
no higher a probability of generating innovations with the support of public research by
means of knowledge spillover or R&D-co-operations. To test the hypothesis we use a
simple model for the probability of industrial innovations with public research support.
We assume that firms have a fixed number of products in their product portfolio and
that each product has a known length of life-cycle, after which the product is renewed.
Then the number of innovations IPUBi introduced by firm i in a 3-year period derived
with findings of public research, depends on the number of innovations Ii the firm is
expected to generate, and the propensity g to receive spillover knowledge from public
research. The spillover propensity should be dependent on the R&D and size of the
firm itself as well as closeness to public research institutions. This can be written as
IPUB I g R D SIZE CLOSENESSi i i i is= ⋅ ( & , , )
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We approximate the expected number of innovations with the number of product inno-
vations the firm has to introduce to substitute existing products which are at the end of
their product-life-cycle. For instance if a firm has three products, e.g. car models, and
the product life cycle is 6 years, the firm has to introduce 1.5 new models on an aver-
age within a 3-year term. In general, the number of product innovations n of a firm
with m products in a 3-year term can be formulated as
I PLCi ji
j
m
= ⋅
−
=
∑3 1
1
.   
If the lengths of PLCs of all products are the same, we get
  I m
PLCi i
=
⋅3
.
The probability of innovations is thus closely dependent on the length of the product-
life-cycle (PLC) and the number of products of the firm’s product range m. Since we
do not know the number of innovations but only whether a firm had introduced public-
research-based innovations or not, the dependent variable is a binary variable. Hence,
we test the effects of firm and location specific variables on the probability of public-
research-based innovations using a probit model. The PLC was estimated by the aver-
age over the lengths of the life-cycles of up to four main product lines given in the
questionnaire. The number of products of the firm is indexed by the inverse of the Her-
findal index for the sales distribution over four main product groups. It mainly serves
as an indicator for the degree of diversification but equals the number of products if all
products have the same sales share.14
As the variable representing the closeness to public research we take the share of sci-
entists employed by public research institutions which are located in counties not more
than 100 km away from the firm’s county.15 Citations in the same county were arbi-
trarily assigned a distance of 10 km. As mentioned before, the firm’s own R&D is ex-
pected to be a requisite for using external knowledge. Since R&D expenditure of the
years before the introduction of the innovations are not available for all firms in the
sample, we use the current R&D-intensity as a proxy. For the size variable we include
the logarithm of the number of employees. We also add dummies for cutting-edge
technologies (pharmaceuticals, agri-chemicals, telecommunication equipment, aircraft
and electronic components) and capital-goods producing industries to control for in-
dustry specific factors such as technical opportunities and the supply effects due to the
large size of public research in Germany in strategic high-technologies and engineering
                                                
14
 The variable was calculated as the inverse of sums of squared sales shares of the 4 major product
groups multiplied. A single product firm will have the value 1 (see Koenig, Licht, 1995).
15
 The regional units used are the 543 German counties (Kreis), which correspond to the NUTS 3
level. Cities with universities are normally a metropolitan county (Kreisfreie Stadt). The distance
between counties was calculated by using the linear distance of the counties’ centres of a metric
map projection.
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technologies. A dummy indicating an East German firm is included because these
firms are expected to hinge more to East German research institutions due to the net-
work of personal contacts within former East Germany. We apply the regression model
first to all public-research-based innovations, and secondly to innovations, which were
mainly supported by the three groups of public research institutions. The first regres-
sion estimates the probability of a firm’s public-research-based innovations, whereas
the other three regressions estimate the probability that a firm used findings of one
group of public science institutions against firms with no public-research-based inno-
vations or which used findings of the other two sources only. We include only firms as
observations that have introduced product or process innovations in the 3-year period.
Table 6 shows the regression results with marginal effects and standard errors.
The propensity to adopt spillovers from public research increases with the size of the
firm as well as with the R&D-intensity. This supports the view that the firm must first
build up an absorption capacity to be able to adopt external knowledge. Spillovers
from public research labs seem to require much more in-house R&D, while polytech-
nics show no discrimination between R&D and non-R&D intensive firms. Further-
more, polytechnics are equally supportive to small and to large firms. Contrary to ex-
pectations, the diversification variable has a significant but negative coefficient. It
suggests that the more the company focuses on innovations, the more likely it is that
they can incorporate findings of public research into their innovations. The length of
the product-life-cycle has the expected sign but is significant only for polytechnics. As
has been seen in figure 1, there is no general significant impact of closeness to public
research institutions on the ability to receive valuable spillovers from them. Yet, the
regressions reveal that firms are more likely to receive help from polytechnics if they
are located far off from universities and other research institutions. While universities
tend to be more oriented towards capital-goods innovations, polytechnics and public
research centres seem to support high-tech innovations. Overall there is no bias to-
wards these industries, when the R&D intensity of firms is included.
Summarising, we find that German firms tend to cite research institutions close by
more often than institutions further away. But firms which are closer to public research
have no higher propensity to receive public research spillover. Yet, polytechnics are
different from universities and public research centres. Polytechnics tend to support
small companies more within their region, while universities and other research labs
transfer knowledge more effectively towards larger companies with no regional prior-
ity.
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Table 6
Probit Estimations for companies with innovations, which could not have been developed without
public research (marginal effects)abcd
 All Universities Polytechnics Public research
labs
ln(employment) 0.024***
(0.007)
0.022***
(0.004)
0.0038
(0.0027)
0.014***
(0.004)
R&D-intensity 0.0042***
(0.0022)
0.0016
(0.0015)
-0.00003
(0.0006)
0.0026**
(0.0013)
Product-life-cycle -0.0011
(0.0013)
-0.0006
(0.0007)
-0.0018**
(0.0008)
-0.0010
(0.00079)
Range of Products -0.011**
(0.0045)
-0.0058**
(0.0022)
-0.0044**
(0.0018)
-0.0032
(0.0027)
Public Scientistse -0.207
(0.237)
   Universitiese -0.387
(0.364)
-0.471**
(0.195)
-0.482
(0.370)
   Polytechnicse 0.197
(0.403)
0.586***
(0.209)
0.377
(0.411)
   Public research
labse
0.017
(0.142)
-0.127*
(0.079)
0.038
(0.152)
Capital goods sectors 0.038
(0.024)
0.039**
(0.016)
0.016**
(0.0089)
-0.0053
(0.015)
Cutting-edge tech-
nologies
0.007
(0.051)
0.011
(0.035)
0.058**
(0.040)
0.066*
(0.048)
East German firm -0.028
(0.032)
0.0034
(0.019)
0.0012
(0.012)
0.032
(0.025)
No. Observations 892 891 889 890
Log-likelihood -371.4 -213.4 -136.9 -206.4
Pseudo- R2 0.0377 0.0931 0.1276 0.0605
χ2- test (df) 26.14 (8)*** 50.38 (10)*** 46.42 (10)*** 32.35 (10)***
a Calculated with Stata 5.0.
b Marginal effects calculated at the means of variables. See Table A2 in the appendix for the means of variables.
For dummy variables the partial effect is calculated as the discrete change of a dummy variable from 0 to 1.
c Statistical significance at the 0.01/0.05/0.1 level is denoted by ***/**/*
d Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets
e Fraction of scientists and engineers employed by public research institutions located in counties within 100 km
distance of the firm’s county (between centres of counties)
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The above findings suggest that knowledge spillovers from polytechnics have a much
closer regional reach than spillovers from universities and public labs. The reach could
also depend on the size of the research institution. It is expected that the larger the
public institution the greater the reach of knowledge spillovers will be, because of the
larger range of topics or because of the uniqueness of their work in fields with indi-
visibility.16 Since faculties of polytechnics are in general very small in contrast to those
of universities and big science centres and rarely carry a unique research program of
their own, their findings would seldom be of nation-wide interest. To discuss other
determinants of the reach of knowledge spillovers from public research, we examine
the influence of firm specific factors on the distance between citing firm and cited re-
search institution. First, one would expect larger firms to be more able or capable in
communicating and co-operating with more remote partners than small companies.
Agglomeration literature suggests small high-tech firms prefer close contacts to nearby
firms for exchanging knowledge. On the other hand firms with a larger R&D staff
should be more capable of receiving technological knowledge from more remote re-
search sources.
Let us now examine firm-specific factors which led to the use of knowledge from re-
mote public research, that is to name a more distant institution as its most valuable
source of knowledge. In the second model we regress distance between the firm and
the cited public research institution on size and R&D-intensity. To take the geographi-
cal distribution of public research institutions and their varying proximity to firms into
account, we use the relation of the actual distance to the average distance to all public
scientists in Germany as the endogenous variable. A dummy for firms from East Ger-
many was included to control for East German effects mentioned above. Some indus-
tries agglomerate in particular regions in Germany like the textile industry in the south-
west of Germany or the steel industry in the Ruhr area. Often industrial districts were
subsequently supported by complementary public research in the same region. Since
we cannot differentiate public research according to technology, we include dummies
for 16 manufacturing industries to control for general industry agglomeration effects.
We also control for the three types of public institutions with dummies. 164 of the 174
pairs of citing firms and cited public institutions the number of scientific staff of the
public institution were identified. For the fraction of the sample we include the size of
the cited research institution. We formulate our model as
dist
dist
f SIZE R D EAST INS ajp
j
j j j p p= ( , & , , , )
with
dist
dist a
a
j
jp p
p
p
p
=
∑
∑
                                                
16
 For very few research institutions, size is dependent on the success of technology transfers to pri-
vate businesses.
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with the distance distjp between citing firm j and cited public research institution p, the
average distance distj of firm j to public scientists, the size of the citing firm j and the
cited research lab p and ap the number of its researchers. Table 7 shows the OLS re-
gression results. Again, it is the R&D-intensity which determines the radius of access
to knowledge from public research by companies and not firm size. The more the firm
spends on R&D divided by sales the more it looks beyond its region to get the best
possible scientific knowledge. This clearly supports the anecdotal evidence for Ger-
many that R&D-intensive companies are not bound to their region – albeit companies
in East Germany seem to be more focused on public research within their region or
within East Germany than firms in West Germany. As fig 3 suggests, there is a highly
significant difference between polytechnics and the other institutions, with the former
used mainly by local companies. The size of the research institution has no effect on
the distance when the type of institutions is included in the regression. Only two sec-
tors show significant differences. Producers of textile are clustered in regions in the
south-west of Germany, so are the public research institutions specialised in textile
research. Producers of glass, stone and clay are on an average more distant to their
most important public research institutions.
Table 7
OLS-regressions of the distance to cited research institution in relation to the average distance of firm
to all research institution
Variables A B
ln(employment) 0.011
(0.020)
0.017
(0.021)
R&D-expenditure per sale 0.017**
(0.0087)
0.017**
(0.0087)
University 0.021
(0.097)
-0.120
(0.138)
Polytechnics -0.302***
(0.107)
-0.375***
(0.125)
ln(Employment of research lab) 0.020
(0.056)
East German Firm -0.181**
(0.075)
-0.143*
(0.087)
Textile, apparel, leather -0.307***
(0.099)
-0.204
(0.132)
Glass, Mineral Products 0.602***
(0.235)
0.901***
(0.160)
No. Observations 174 162
Pseudo- R2 0.146 0.1585
F-Test (df) 6,02 (7)*** 8.26 (8)***
a Calculated with Stata 5.0.
b Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets.
c Statistical significance at the 0.01/0.05/0.1 level is denoted by ***/**/*
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5. Conclusions
This paper presents results of a recent survey on industrial innovations that have been
made possible by academic and other publicly funded research. Using an extensive
survey of companies in the manufacturing sector, it attempts to quantify the effects of
public research on industrial innovations which is the economic justification for public
research. In a second step we examine effects of firm-specific factors on the propensity
of firms to use and incorporate knowledge generated by public research for these inno-
vations. Summarising the findings, we conclude that public research has indeed an
immediate effect on industrial innovations. One of the basic findings is that a consider-
able share of companies have identified product and process innovations, which they
would not have developed in the absence of recent research of public institutions and
that some of them are in the position of naming the specific source of the research out-
put they used. The results are similar to the findings of Mansfield (1991) for the US.
This shows that overall public research may transfer technology successfully to indus-
trial companies.
Yet, the results must be considered with some caution. We only include public-
research-based innovations identified by the firms directly, and not innovations that
have not been perceived as requiring essential public support despite their science
base. Furthermore, it is likely that we get only the short-term effects of public research.
But even if we take the limitations into account, we would conclude that there is not
much evidence of publicly funded research in Germany being fully justified by identi-
fiable transfers to industrial innovations. Probably more convincing is the evidence for
differences in the effectiveness of technology transfer between various types of public
research institutions. It seems that the success of technology transfer is connected with
the share of research grants from industry. The most effective public research institu-
tions are financed to a considerable amount through project-related and industry re-
search funds. Taking away the Fraunhofer-Society institutes for applied research and
the respected large technical universities like Aachen with excellent research oriented
towards industrial innovation, there is not much appreciation for public research by
private businesses with respect to industrial product and process innovations. Espe-
cially the federal research centres, which are to support industrial innovations, should
reconsider their research strategy. That also means the distinction between effective
and ineffective public research cannot be made by institutions of applied and basic re-
search. Public research centres are supposed to perform much more applied research
than universities. Yet, it is only the universities which are named frequently. Personal
commitment of academic scientists and the higher fluctuation in academic research
could be responsible for the greater impact of universities and Fraunhofer-institutes,
for they have the highest employment turnover within the research infrastructure.
Technology transfer occurs through qualified academics in firms’ R&D labs using the
knowledge they received at public research institutions. This is where big science labs
and other non-academic public research fail. They do not spin off much human capital,
for one of their justification is that they care for long-term research requiring low staff
turnover rates.
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For a technology policy these conclusions are highly relevant. First, although Germany
provides a variety of public research institutions, the effectiveness of technology trans-
fer varies considerably between institutions. Promoting technology transfer can be ac-
complished by shifting funds from ineffective to more effective research institutions,
as well as by changing the way the ineffective institutions, conduct their role of trans-
ferring technology to industry. Secondly, proximity may not be of equal importance
within Germany than within other countries, especially in the US. The hypothesis that
proximity is important especially for high-tech or R&D-intensive industries is clearly
rejected in the case of Germany. Lastly, if technology transfer is mainly effective in the
formation and transfer of human capital, i.e. qualified academics, then public research
consequently has to support this transfer channel. Thus education and short-term re-
search of scientists and engineers in public research labs should become an essential
feature of the national technology policy.
29
References
Abramson, H.N., J. Encarnação, P.P. Reid, U. Schmoch, 1997, Technology Transfer
Systems in the United States and Germany: Lessons and Perspectives, National
Academy, Washington, D.C.
Acs, Z., D. Audretsch, 1990, Innovation and small firms, MIT, Cambridge, Mass.
Acs, Z., D. Audretsch, M. Feldman, 1992, Real Effects of Academic Research: Com-
ment, American Economic Review 82, 363-367.
Adams, J. D., 1990, Fundamental Stocks of Knowledge and Productivity Growth,
Journal of Political Economy 98, 673-702.
Anselin, L., A. Varga, Z. Acs, 1997, Local Geographic Spillovers between University
Research and High Technology Innovations, Journal of Urban Economics 42,
422-448.
Arrow, K.J., 1962, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in: R. Nelson (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and
Social Factors, Princeton Univ., Princeton, 609-625.
Audretsch, D., P. Stephan, 1996, Company-Scientist Locational Links: The Case of
Biotechnology, American Economic Review 86, 641-652.
Bania, N., R. Eberts, M. S. Fogarty 1993, Universities and startup of new companies:
can we generalize from Route 128 and Silicon Valley? The Review of Economics
and Statistics 75, 761-766.
Beise, M., A. Spielkamp, 1996, Technologietransfer von Hochschulen: Ein Insider-
Outsider-Effekt, ZEW-Discussion Paper No. 96-10, Mannheim.
Berman, E. M., 1990, The economic impact of industry-funded university R&D, Re-
search Policy 19, 97-114.
Bloedon, R. V., D. R. Stokes, 1994, Making University/Industry Collaboration Re-
search Succeed, Research Technology Management 24, 373-386.
BMBF (German Ministry for Education, Science, Research and Technology), 1996,
Bundesbericht Forschung 1996, Bonn
BMBF (German Ministry for Education, Science, Research and Technology), 1998,
Germany’s Technological Performance: Updated and Expanded Report, Bonn.
Brooks, H., 1994, The relationship between science and technology, Research Policy
23, 477-486.
Brooks, H., 1996,  The Evolution of U.S. Science Policy, in: B.L.R. Smith, C.E.
Barfield (eds.), Technology, R&D, and the Economy, Brookings Institution,
Washington, 15-40.
Cahan, D., 1989, An institute for an empire: the Physikalisch-Technische Reichsan-
stalt, 1871 - 1918, Cambridge Univ., Cambridge.
Camagni, R. (ed), 1991, Innovation networks: spatial perspectives, Belhaven, London.
30
Castells, M., P. Hall, 1994, Technopols of the World - The making of twenty-first-
century industrial complexes, Routledge, London.
Cohen, W., 1995, Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity, in: Stoneman, P. (ed.),
Handbook of Economics of Innovation and Technical Change, Blackwell, Ox-
ford, 182-264.
Cohen, W., R. Florida, W. R. Goe, 1994, University-Industry Research Centers in the
United States, Research Report Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh.
Cohen, W., D. Levinthal, 1990, Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning
and Innovation, Administration Science Quarterly 35, 128-152.
Dasgupta, P., P.A. David, 1994, Towards a New Economics of Science, Research
Policy 23, 5, 487-521.
Foray, D., J. Mairesse, 1997, Sur le financement public de la recherche de base: la voix
de l’économie de la recherche, mimeo.
Fromhold-Eisebith, M., 1992, Meßbarkeit und Messung des regionalen Wissens- und
Technologietransfers aus Hochschulen, in: NIW (ed.), Erfolgskontrollen in der
Technologiepolitik, NIW-Workshop 1992, Hannover, 117-136.
Gemuenden, H. G. und Walter, A. (1997): The Relationship Promoter - Initiator, Moti-
vator and Co-Ordinator for Inter-Organisations Innovation Co-Operation, in: H.
G. Gemuenden, T. Ritter, A. Walter (eds.), Relationships and Networks in Inter-
national Markets, Oxford, Elsevier, 180-197.
Gibons, M., R. Johnston, 1974, The Role of Science in Technological Innovation, Re-
search Policy 3, 220-242.
Granovetter, M., 1985, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Em-
beddedness, American Journal of Sociology 91, 3, 481-510.
Grotz, R., B. Braun, 1997, Territorial or Trans-territorial Networking: Spatial Aspects
of Technology-oriented Cooperation within the German Mechanical Engineering
Industry, Regional Studies 31, 545-557.
Harhoff, D., 1998, Are there Financing Constraints for R&D and Investment in Ger-
man Manufacturing Firms? Annales d’Économie et de Statistique (49-50), 421-
456.
Harhoff, D. et al., 1996, Innovationsaktivitaeten kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen:
Ergebnisse des Mannheimer Innovationspanels, Schriftenreihe des ZEW, No. 8,
Nomos, Baden-Baden.
Hauff, V., F. W. Scharf, 1975, Modernisierung der Volkswirtschaft: Technologiepoli-
tik als Strukturpolitik, Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.
Hetmeier, H.-W., 1998, Methodik der Berechnung der Ausgaben und des Personals der
Hochschulen fuer Forschung und experimentelle Entwicklung ab dem Berichts-
jahr 1995, Wirtschaft und Statistik (2), 153-163.
31
Hohn, H.-W., 1989, Forschungspolitik als Ordnungspolitik: Das Modell Fraunhofer-
Gesellschaft und seine Genese im Forschungssystem der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, MPIG Discussion Paper 89/8, Koeln.
Jaffe, A., 1989, Real Effects of Academic Research, American Economic Review 79,
957-970.
Jaffe, A., M. Trajtenberg, R. Henderson, 1993, Geographic Localization of Knowledge
Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations, Quarterly Journal of Economics
108, 577-598.
Jensen, R., M. Thursby, 1998, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Tale of University
Licensing, NBER Working Paper No. 6698, Washington, D.C.
Johnson, J. A., 1990, The Kaiser’s chemists: science and modernization in imperial
Germany, Univ. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC.
Jones, Ch. I., J.C. Williams, 1997, Measuring the Social Return to R&D, Stanford
University Working paper, forthcoming in Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Katz, J. S., 1994, Geographical Proximity and Scientific Collaboration, Scientometrics
31 (1), 31-43.
Kealey, T., 1998, Why science is endogenous: a debate with Paul David (and Ben
Martin, Paul Romer, Chris Freeman, Luc Soete and Keith Pavitt), Research Pol-
icy 26 (7-8), 897-923.
Keck, O., 1976, West German science policy science the early 1960’s: trends and ob-
jectives, Research Policy 5, 116-157.
Keck, O., 1980, Government policy and technical choice in the German reactor pro-
gram, Research Policy 9, 302-356.
Keck, O., 1993, The National System for Technical Innovations in Germany, in: R.
Nelson (ed), National innovation Systems, Oxford Univ., Oxford, 115-157.
Kline, S. J., N. Rosenberg, 1986, An Overview of Innovation, in: R. Landau, N. Ro-
senberg (eds.), The Positive Sum Strategy, National Academy, Washington, 275-
305.
Koenig, H., G. Licht, 1995, Patents, R&D and Innovation, ifo Studien 41, 521-543.
Leyden, D. P., A. N. Link, 1991a, Why are Governmental R&D and Private R&D
Complements? Applied Economics 23, 1673-81.
Leyden, D. P., A. N. Link, 1991b, Government’s Role in Innovation, Kluwer, Dor-
drecht et al.
Licht, G., E. Nerlinger, 1998, New technology-based firms in Germany: a survey of
recent evidence, Research Policy 26 (9), 1005-1022.
Lundvall, B.-A., 1988, Innovation as an interactive process: from user-producer inter-
action to the national system of innovation, in: G. Dosi et al. (eds.), Technical
Change and Economic Theory, Pinter, London, New York, 349-369.
32
Mansfield, E., 1991, Academic research and industrial innovation, Research Policy 20,
1-12.
Mansfield, E., 1995, Academic Research Underlying Industrial Innovations: Sources,
Characteristics, and Financing, Review of Economics and Statistics 77, 55-65.
Mansfield, E., J.-Y. Lee, 1996, The modern university: contributor to industrial inno-
vation and recipient of industrial R&D support, Research Policy 25, 1047-1058.
Martin, B., A. Salter, 1996, The Relationship between Publicly Funded Basic Research
and Economic Performance, A Spru Review, Report prepared for HM Treasury,
University of Sussex, Brighton.
Mayntz, R., 1991, Scientific research and political intervention: The structural devel-
opment of publicly financed research in the Federal Republic of Germany, in: A.
Orsi Battaglini, F. Roversi Monanco (eds.), The University within the research
System - An international comparison, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 45-60.
McDonough, E., K. B. Kahn, 1996, Using ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ technologies for global
new product development, R&D Management 26 (3), 241-253.
Meyer-Krahmer, F., 1985, Innovation Behavior and Regional Indigenous Potential,
Regional Studies 19, 6, 523-534.
Nadiri, M. I., 1993, Innovations and Technological Spillovers, NBER Working Paper
No. 4423, Cambridge, Mass.
Narin, F., K. S. Hamilton, D. Olivastro, 1997, The increasing linkages between U.S.
technology and public science, Research Policy 26, 317-330.
Nelson, R., 1986, Institutions Supporting Technical Advance in Industry, American
Economic Review 76, 186-189.
Nohria, N., R. G. Eccles, 1992, Face-to-Face: Making Network Organization Work, in:
N. Nohria, R.G. Eccles (eds.), Networks and organizations: structure, form, and
action, Harvard Univ., Boston, MA., 288-308.
OECD, 1996, Proposed Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Technological In-
novation Data: Oslo-Manual, 1. Rev., Paris.
OECD, 1997, Main Science and Technology Indicators, Paris.
Ritter, G.A., 1992, Großforschung und Staat in Deutschland: Ein historischer Ueber-
blick, C.H. Beck, Muenchen.
Rosenberg, N., R. Nelson, 1994, American Universities and Technical Advance in In-
dustry, Research Policy 23, 323-348.
Saxenian, A., 1994, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley
and Route 128, Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass., London.
Schimank, U., 1990, Technology Policy and Technology Transfer from State financed
Research Institutions to the Economy: some German Experiences, Science and
Public Policy 17 (4), 219-228.
33
Shapley, D., R. Roy, 1985, Lost at the Frontier: U.S. Science and Technology Policy
Adrift, ISI, Philadelphia.
Stephan, P., 1996, The Economics of Science, Journal of Economic Literature 34,
1199-1235.
Sternberg, R., 1997, Intraregional versus Interregional Linkages between R&D Institu-
tions and Innovative SMEs - Empirical Results from Recent Surveys in German
Regions. Paper presented to the European Network on „Networks, Collective
Learning and RTD in Regionally-Clustered High-Technology SMEs„, Munich,
February 28th -March 1st.
Sternberg, R., 1996, Regionale Spezialisierung und raeumliche Konzentration FuE-
intensiver Wirtschaftszweige in den Kreisen Westdeutschlands - Indizien fuer In-
dustriedistrikte? Berichte zur deutschen Landeskunde 70, 133-155.
Stokes, D. E., 1997, Pasteur’s quadrant: basic science and technological innovation,
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
Szoelloesi-Janze, M., H. Trischler (eds.), 1990, Großforschung in Deutschland: Bei-
traege zur Geschichte eines Forschungstyps, Campus, Frankfurt, New York.
Tritschler, H., 1990, Planungseuphorie und Forschungssteuerung in den 1960er Jahren
in der Luft- und Raumfahrtforschung, in: M. Szoelloesi-Janze, H. Trischler, 117-
139.
Wiegand, J., 1990, Die Gruendung der GMD - Mathematik oder Datenverarbeitung?,
in: M. Szoelloesi-Janze, H. Trischler, 78-96.
Wissenschaftsrat, 1993, Drittmittel der Hochschulen 1970 bis 1990, Koeln.
34
Data Appendix
Data were taken from the fourth wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel. This multi-
year innovation survey has been conducted by the Zentrum fuer Europaeische
Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) and the Institut fuer angewandte Sozialforschung (infas).
The Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) is part of the Community Innovation Survey
(CIS) a joint effort of Eurostat and the EU Commission to collect firm level data on
input and output on innovation throughout the European Union. The questionnaire
follows the guidelines for innovation statistics containing in the OSLO-manual of the
OECD (1996). In Germany, the survey is organised as an annual panel study which
started in 1992. The sampling frame stems from the records of the largest credit rating
company (Creditreform) in Germany. The sample is a stratified random sample and
covers all manufacturing industries and selected service industries, e.g. software de-
velopment, in West and East Germany. In our analysis the sample was confined to
manufacturing industries. Enterprises with less than five employees are deliberately
excluded. Industries which are supposed to be very innovative are oversampled. The
survey is a postal survey with several reminders. Approximately 2,300 companies
completed the questionnaire in the fourth year of the survey. The response rate was
about 20 percent. To account for a possible bias arising from self-selection of innova-
tive firms into the survey, a non-response analysis is conducted each year by phone,
which yields a response rate of nearly 90 percent. Firms’ weights are corrected for a
positive response bias of innovating firms (see also Koenig, Licht 1995, p. 524).
Before the mailing of the first wave began, every enterprise with at least 250 employ-
ees, that is roughly a third of the sample, had been called by phone to check the address
and to identify the person most suited to answer the questionnaire. Since we ask for the
respondent’s name and his function in the questionnaire we know that in firms with
less than 100 employees normally a director answers and in larger firms the head of the
R&D department. If there is none, it will again be the director who answers or his dep-
uty. Of course, some information we ask for is not regularly gathered by the firms and
so is difficult to provide, even for the person most suited. After the third wave we in-
vestigated in some regressions of key variables whether a change of the contact would
have a statistically significant influence on the mean or variance of the estimated coef-
ficients but until now we could not find any. So we believe that the - sometimes rather
rough - figures provided by the firms are either only slightly biased or not biased at all.
Errors should cancel out if the sample is sufficiently large and weights for raising are
similar. Unfortunately, the weights are quite unequal and for some topics sample size is
rather modest. We tried to mitigate that problem by carefully inspecting the data. For
example, if an enterprise appears as influential in one investigation in one year we will
pay special attention to it in all investigations in every year. So our estimates are rough
but we believe they are still worth reporting.
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Table A1
Public research institutions cited by at least two companies as most important to the development of
their innovations between 1993 and 1996
Institution Percentage of
citations
Percentage of
R&D staff a
Institutes of the Fraunhofer-Society (FhG) 12.8 3.2
RWTH Aachen 8.2 5.8
TU Dresden 5.1 2.6
Universitaet Stuttgart 3.1 2.1
Bergakademie Freiberg 2.6 0.5
Universitaet Nuernberg-Erlangen 2.6 2.8
Ruhruniversitaet Bochum 2.6 2.6
TH Darmstadt 2.6 1.5
Fachhochschule Nuernberg 2.0 0.4
Universitaet Hannover 1.5 1.2
TU Clausthal-Zellerfeld 1.5 0.5
TU Hamburg-Harburg 1.5 0.4
Fachhochschule Aachen 1.0 0.7
TU Muenchen 1.5 2.9
TU Berlin 1.0 3.4
Universitaet Rostock 1.0 1.3
Fachhochschule Aalen 1.0 0.1
Uni Paderborn 1.0 1.5
Uni Karlsruhe (TH) 1.0 2.0
Uni Braunschweig 1.0 1.4
Deutsche Forschungsanstalt f. Luft- und
Raumfahrt (DLR), Koeln
1.0 1.6
a
 Share of scientific personnel in science, engineering and medical faculties in Germany (1993)
Source: ZEW Mannheim Innovation Panel, BMBF (1996), Statistisches Bundesamt (unpublished).
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Table A2
Descriptive statistics for the probit regressions
Variable Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max
Endogenous variables
Public-research-
based innovations
0.156 - 0 1
 University 0.074 - 0 1
 Polytechnics 0.043 - 0 1
 Public research
 labs
0.067 - 0 1
Exogenous vari-
ables
ln(employment) 5.07 1.61 1.09 12.22
R&D-intensity 3.21 5.10 0 46.25
Product-life-cycle 10.66 11.68 0 100
Range of Products 3.83 10.46 1 222
East-German firm 0.25 - 0 1
Public Scientists 0.096 0.054 0.0009 0.227
Universities 0.095 0.053 0 0.23
Polytechnics 0.096 0.051 0 0.21
Public research
labs
0.098 0.076 0.0002 0.23
Capital goods
sectors
0.55 - 0 1
Cutting edge tech-
nologies
0.54 - 0 1
Source: ZEW Mannheim Innovation Panel
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Table A3
Descriptive statistics for the distance OLS regressions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Endogenous Variable
Distance to cited insti-
tute divided by average
distance to all institutes
0.481 0.489 0.023 1.793
Exogenous variable
ln(employment) 5.729 1.710 1.945 9.798
R&D-intensity 3.700 4.718 0 40
   Universities 0.586 - 0 1
   Polytechnics 0.189 - 0 1
   Public research labs 0.224 - 0 1
East German firm 0.275 - 0 1
Textile, apparel, leather 0.023 - 0 1
Glass, mineral products 0.023 - 0 1
Employment of cited
research institute
1965.7 2184.9 10 7102
Source: ZEW Mannheim Innovation Panel
